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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Over 100,000 people in the United States die each year due to 
“nonerror, adverse effects” of prescription drugs. 1   Most of the 
prescriptions being filled in the United States are generic.  In 2012, 
eighty-four percent of dispensed prescriptions were generic and the 
amount of money spent on generic prescriptions increased by $8 
billion.2  Because of recent changes in failure-to-warn claims against 
drug manufacturers, generic drug users who are injured by taking the 
drug are facing an unfortunate dilemma.  
In 1984, federal law changed the way the pharmaceutical 
markets operate by making prescription drugs more affordable for 
consumers.3  But affordability comes at another cost.  Because of the 
federal law preemption doctrine and gaps between state and federal 
labeling requirements, generic drug consumers who are injured by 
taking the drug are unable to sue the manufacturer for inadequate 
labeling, even though consumers injured by brand name drugs can 
sue the brand name manufacturer for the same inadequate labeling.4 
The 1984 Drug Price Competition and Patent Term 
Restoration Act (Hatch–Waxman Act) allowed for generic drugs to 
obtain Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approval by showing 
that the generic drug is biologically equivalent to the brand name 
drug and that the labeling of the generic drug is the same as the 
                                                        
* Samantha Koopman is a second year student at Pepperdine University 
School of Law.  Samantha graduated from Gonzaga University with a Bachelor of 
Business Administration in Accounting and Finance.  I would like to thank editors 
Alice Won, Steve Dixon, and especially Emily Casey for all of their hard work and 
help to make this comment the best it could be.  I also owe a huge thank you to 
God for an extremely blessed life full of great opportunities, my family for their 
unwavering belief in me as a student and a writer, my dog Stanley for his constant 
presence at my side while I wrote, and my fiancé Ryan for loving me, encouraging 
me, and bringing home Big Gulps and Reese’s on especially rough days.  I love 
you guys! 
 
1 Barbara Starfield, Is US Health Really the Best in the World?, 284 J. AM. 
MED. ASS’N 483, 484 (2000), available at http://www.drug-
education.info/documents/iatrogenic.pdf. 
2 Id. 
3 21 U.S.C. § 2(j) (2012). 
4  PUBLIC CITIZEN, GENERIC DRUG LABELING 24 (2013), available at 
http://www.citizen.org/documents/2138.pdf. 
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approved labeling for the brand name drug.5  Many state laws have 
different requirements for generic and brand name drugs, so 
preemption issues arise.  In Wyeth v. Levine, the U.S. Supreme Court 
held that federal drug regulations do not preempt state law failure-to-
warn claims against the brand name manufacturers,6 but the Court in 
PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing later held that federal drug regulations do 
preempt the same state law failure-to-warn claims against the 
manufacturers of generic drugs. 7   In the recent Mutual 
Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett case, the Court held that 
manufacturers of generic drugs cannot be sued under state law for 
design-defect claims because the state law is preempted by federal 
law.8 
The impact of these cases is great on consumers who choose 
to take a generic drug over a name brand.  Most people who buy 
prescription medication buy the generic brand when available. 9  
Often a brand name manufacturer will stop selling its drug once the 
generic brand enters the market. 10   And all states allow the 
substitution of the generic drug for the brand name, with some states 
even requiring the substitution. 11   These decisions impact 
administrative law by making it clear that Congress and the FDA 
need to change the regulations governing manufacturers of generic 
brands so that consumers have a remedy under state tort law when 
they choose to save money by purchasing generic brand prescriptions 
instead of their brand name counterparts.  If generic manufacturers 
are able to unilaterally change their drug labels, they could keep up 
with new warnings without having to rely on brand name 
                                                        
5 See supra, note 3. 
6 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
7 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
8 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
9  See Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2584 (citing DEPT. OF HEALTH AND HUMAN 
SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 7 (2010), 
available at http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf). 
10  Id. (citing Brief for Marc T. Law et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting 
Respondents at 18, PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011) (No. 09-993)). 
11 Id. at 2583 (citing Thomas P. Christensen et al., Drug Product Selection: 
Legal Issues, 41 J. AM. PHARM. ASS’N 868, 869 (2001); DEPT. OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVS., supra note 9, at 7).  States that require substitution when possible 
are Florida, Hawaii, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, 
Nevada, New Jersey, New York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, 
and West Virginia.  See infra note 53.  
Spring 2014           Hidden Risks of Taking Generic Drugs over Brand Name 115 
manufacturers.  Such a change would likely prompt the Court to 
change its position as well.12 
This comment will explain how claims against drug 
manufacturers may or may not be preempted depending on whether 
the drug that caused the injury was a brand name or generic drug, and 
will suggest several ways that the seemingly incongruous results of 
these claims can be balanced for injured patients.  Part II explains the 
historical progression of federal drug labeling laws and the 
differences between state generic substitution laws.  Part III describes 
the federal preemption doctrine and failure-to-warn claims under 
state law.  Part IV examines recent case law from the Supreme Court 
concerning the applicability of federal drug regulations to brand 
name and generic drug manufacturers.  Part V assesses the innovator 
liability theory proposed by some courts and the implications of the 
theory for drug manufacturers.  Part VI considers the impact the 
recent Court decisions may have on generic drug substitution.  Part 
IV proposes various ways that the options for patients injured by 
prescription drugs can be improved. 
 
II. FEDERAL REGULATORY FRAMEWORK OF THE 
PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 
 
A. Early Drug Regulation—The Food and Drug Administration and 
the Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act 
 
The FDA was created to enhance public health and protect 
consumers by regulating food and drugs in the United States.13  The 
FDA’s regulatory duties began with the Pure Food and Drugs Act, 
which was passed by Congress in 1906.14  It provided basic elements 
of food and drug protection, 15  but did not require any federal 
                                                        
12 See infra Part VII.A–B. 
13  History, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/default.htm (last updated May 
29, 2013). 
14  Legislation, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/RegulatoryInformation/Legislation/default.htm (last updated 
July 9, 2012). 
15  FDA History–Part I, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm054819.htm (last 
updated June 18, 2009).  The 1906 Food and Drug Act banned interstate transport 
of illegal food and drugs and regulated drug labeling by requiring drugs to be 
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approval or notification procedures for new drugs prior to their 
placement in the pharmaceutical market. 16   In 1938, the 
pharmaceutical market was revolutionized by the passage of the 
Federal Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act (FDCA). 17   Enacted in 
response to the death of 107 people after those people took a legally 
marketed drug,18 the FDCA’s purpose was to create a notification 
system where brand name drug manufacturers were required to 
provide safety data to the FDA in a new drug application (NDA).19  
The FDCA gave authority to the FDA to prevent a new drug from 
entering the market if the drug’s safety was not properly 
demonstrated. 20   The NDA required extensive information from 
brand name drug manufacturers, including: 
 
(A) full reports of investigations which have been 
made to show whether or not such drug is safe for use 
and whether such drug is effective in use; (B) a full 
list of the articles used as components of such drug; 
(C) a full statement of the composition of such drug; 
(D) a full description of the methods used in, and the 
facilities and controls used for, the manufacture, 
processing, and packing of such drug; (E) such 
samples of such drug and of the articles used as 
components thereof as the Secretary may require; (F) 
specimens of the labeling proposed to be used for 
                                                                                                                                
labeled in accordance with specific standards.  Id.  Food and drug labels were not 
allowed to be misleading or untrue and certain “dangerous” ingredients had to be 
listed on the label.  Id. 
16  Colleen Kelly, The Balance Between Innovation and Competition: The 
Hatch–Waxman Act, the 2003 Amendments, and Beyond, 66 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 
417, 419 (2011). 
17 See Legislation, supra note 14. 
18  Id.; see Carol Ballentine, Sulfanilamide Disaster, U.S. FOOD & DRUG 
ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/aboutfda/whatwedo/history/productregulation/sulfanilamidedis
aster/default.htm (last updated Oct. 7, 2010) (describing the 1937 Elixir 
Sulfanilamide Incident, in which more than 100 people in fifteen states died from 
ingesting a sulfanilamide elixir mixed with diethylene glycol, which turned out to 
be a deadly poison but was not realized before the medication was distributed to 
patients because food and drug laws at the time did not require safety studies to be 
done on new drugs). 
19 Kelly, supra note 16, at 419. 
20 Id. 
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such drug; and (G) any assessments required under 
section 335c of this title.21 
 
Applicants must also describe all of their experiences and 
observations during all phases of development and ownership, 
including descriptions and analyses of any information material to 
the safety and effectiveness of the drug.22 
In 1962, the FDA’s regulatory authority was reinforced by the 
passage of the Keflauver–Harris Amendments,23 which changed the 
drug safety review procedure from a simple notification process to a 
more complex approval system. 24   The amendments shifted the 
burden of proof from the FDA to the drug manufacturers by forcing 
manufacturers to show that their drugs were safe for use before the 
drug could be marketed.25  Under the new law, the NDA was “the 
vehicle through which drug sponsors formally propose that the FDA 
approve a new pharmaceutical for sale and marketing in the U.S.”26  
Application approval required the manufacturer to submit reports 
showing: (1) that the drug is safe and effective for use; (2) the 
components and composition of the drug; (3) the methods, facilities, 
and controls used to manufacture, process, and pack the drug; (4) 
samples of the drug and its components; (5) examples of the drug’s 
proposed label; and (6) research on pediatric use, if applicable. 27  
Once the manufacturer submitted its application, the FDA would 
either approve the drug or give the manufacturer an opportunity for a 
hearing on whether the application may be approved.28 
After the passage of the 1962 Drug Amendments, the FDA 
implemented numerous procedures governing the approval of generic 
drugs.  Under the updated procedures, a generic drug manufacturer of 
a pre-1962 brand name drug submitted an abbreviated new drug 
application (ANDA), which required data demonstrating that the 
                                                        
21 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1) (2012). 
22 21 C.F.R. § 314.50(d)(5)(iv) (2014). 
23 See Legislation, supra note 14. 
24 Kelly, supra note 16, at 420. 
25 21 U.S.C. § 355(d). 
26  New Drug Application, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/ 
HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/ApprovalApplications/NewDrugApplication
NDA/ (last updated Feb. 21, 2013). 
27 21 U.S.C. § 355(b)(1). 
28 Id. § 355(c)(1). 
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generic drug was as safe and effective as its brand name 
counterpart.29  Generic manufacturers of post-1962 brand name drugs 
had to submit the entire NDA, although the FDA did allow for 
generic manufacturers to use published scientific literature to 
demonstrate safety and effectiveness rather than require them to 
perform their own clinical trials, as was required of the brand name 
drug manufacturers.30  
In 1983, the FDA proposed a new regulation that would allow 
for generic drug manufacturers of post-1962 brand name drugs to 
only have to complete the ANDA process.  At the same time, the 
generic drug manufacturers filed a lawsuit against the FDA, hoping 
to force the FDA to create an ANDA process for all generic drug 
manufacturers. 31   Eventually, Congress resolved the controversy 
surrounding generic drug approval by passing the Hatch–Waxman 
Act.32 
 
B. The Hatch–Waxman Act 
 
Amid complaints and controversy surrounding the differing 
procedures for generic drug manufacturers trying to get drugs 
approved for marketing, 33  Congress passed the Drug Price 
Competition and Patent Term Restoration Act of 1984 34  that 
“effectively created the modern generic pharmaceutical industry.”35  
The Act, commonly known as the Hatch–Waxman Act, was designed 
to balance two competing interests: to encourage brand name 
pharmaceutical companies to continue investing in the research and 
development of new drugs while also increasing competition among 
                                                        
29 Kelly, supra note 16, at 420. 
30 Id. 
31 Id.; see Nat’l Ass’n of Pharm. Mfrs., Inc. v. Heckler, 83 Civ. 4817 (WCC) 
(S.D.N.Y. 1983).  This case was dismissed once the Hatch–Waxman Act was 
enacted because the Act superseded all prior FDA regulations regarding the generic 
drug approval process.  Kelly, supra note 16, at 420. 
32 Kelly, supra note 16, at 420. 
33 Id. 
34 21 U.S.C. § 301 (2012). 
35  Matthew Avery, Continuing Abuse of the Hatch–Waxman Act by 
Pharmaceutical Patent and the Failure of the 2003 Amendments, 60 HASTINGS L.J. 
171, 175 (2008). 
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generic drug manufacturers in the pharmaceutical market as a way to 
lower drug prices and costs to consumers.36   
A Report by the House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
analyzed the ANDA procedure and patent term restoration pieces of 
the Act.37  Congress’s goal was to lower the cost of drug prices for 
consumers by making it easier for generic drugs to enter the 
pharmaceutical market. 38   The House Report remarked that full 
NDAs, which required human clinical studies, were not valuable or 
efficient for the generic manufacturer.  Instead, the FDA recognized 
that requiring the manufacturers to repeat the testing would be 
“unnecessary and wasteful [as well as] unethical because it requires 
that some sick patients take placebos and be denied treatment known 
to be effective”39  The Report also acknowledged that most drugs at 
the time had expired patents but no generic equivalent, demonstrating 
a need for a process to increase the presence of generic drugs in the 
market. 40   Additionally, the Report determined that increased 
availability of generic drugs would “save American consumers $920 
million over the next 12 years,” and would save federal and state 
governments millions of dollar as well.41  
Congress’s other goal of incentivizing research companies to 
develop new drugs was an effort to “restor[e] some of the time lost 
on patent life while the product is awaiting pre-market approval.”42  
Although the patent term was seventeen years, the effective patent 
term was shorter because of the requirements of the regulatory 
review process. 43   Congress adopted the ANDA procedures and 
patent term restoration in the Act to help solve some of these 
problems. 
                                                        
36 Kelly, supra note 16, at 417.  See H.R. REP. NO. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984), for 
Congress’s reasoning in passing the Act. “Congress aimed to increase generic drug 
entry into the pharmaceutical market in order to drive down drug prices and 
consumer drug costs. . . . [I]t was not beneficial or efficient for generic drug 
manufacturers to submit full NDAs,” and there was a “need for a streamlined 
process to increase the number of generic drugs on the market.”  Kelly, supra note 
16, at 421. 
37 H.R. REP. No. 98-857, pt. 1 (1984). 
38 Id. 
39 Id. at 16. 
40 Id. at 17. 
41 Id. 
42 Id. at 15. 
43 Id. at 17. 
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The Hatch–Waxman Act amended a portion of the FDCA by 
allowing all generic drug manufacturers to use an ANDA to prove 
the safety and effectiveness of their drugs.44  The ANDA requires 
generic drug manufacturers to show that their new generic drug  
 
is bioequivalent to the [brand name] drug[,] . . . that 
the active ingredients of the new drug are of the 
pharmacological or therapeutic class as those of the 
[brand name] drug, . . . and the new drug can be 
expected to have the same therapeutic effect as the 
[brand name] drug when administered to patients for 
[the same] condition . . . .45 
 
Because of the changes Congress put into place, the cost of bringing 
a generic drug to the market is less than $2 million, almost a quarter 
of the typical cost of bringing a brand name drug to market.46 
Additionally, brand name drug manufacturers must conduct 
human tests to show that the drug is safe and effective, and must 
submit those results in an NDA. 47   However, generic drug 
manufacturers are no longer required to provide their own clinical 
trial data to show safety and efficacy, and are able to use the brand 
name drug’s clinical trial data instead.48  This new regulatory system 
under Hatch–Waxman is designed to guarantee the quality of generic 
drugs, simplify the approval process, reduce unnecessary time and 
money sunk into repetitive clinical trial research, and lessen the time 
to get the drugs on the market.49 
 
C. Drug Substitution Laws 
 
In an effort to help consumers save money on prescription 
drug costs, states have put substitution policies into place that allow 
                                                        
44 Avery, supra note 35, at 175. 
45 21 U.S.C. § 355(j)(2)(A)(iv) (2012). 
46 DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS., ASPE ISSUE BRIEF: EXPANDING THE 
USE OF GENERIC DRUGS 4–5 (2010), available at 
http://aspe.hhs.gov/sp/reports/2010/GenericDrugs/ib.pdf. 
47 Danielle L. Steele, The “Duty of Sameness” as a Shield—Generic Drug 
Manufacturers’ Tort Liability and the Failure of the Need for Label Independence 
After PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 43 SETON HALL L. REV. 441, 448 (2013). 
48 Avery, supra note 35, at 176. 
49 Id. 
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pharmacists to dispense cheaper generic equivalents for brand name 
drugs; that is, when a physician fills out a prescription, he or she has 
the option of requiring the brand name be dispensed. 50   If the 
physician does not specify that the brand name drug is required, state 
laws step in to explain when substitution is allowed.  Eleven states 
require express permission for substitution.51  The other thirty-nine 
states allow generic substitution unless the physician expressly 
forbids it. 52   When substitution is allowed, some states require 
                                                        
50 See, e.g., CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE § 4052.5(b) (West 2013) (“In no case 
shall a [generic substitution] be made . . . if the prescriber personally indicates, 
either orally or in his or her own handwriting, ‘Do not substitute’ or words of 
similar meaning.”); KY. REV. STAT. ANN. § 217.822(1) (West 2013) (“When a 
pharmacist receives a prescription for a brand name drug . . . he shall select a lower 
priced therapeutically equivalent drug . . . .”); see also PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 
131 S. Ct. 2567, 2583 (2011) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[A]ll States ‘allow the 
physician to specify that the brand name must be prescribed, although with 
different levels of effort from the physician.’”). 
51  Oklahoma forbids substitution of the generic equivalent without the 
physician’s authority.  See OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 353.13(D) (West 2013).  
Alabama, Delaware, Indiana, Missouri, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington all 
require physicians to sign on one of two lines to indicate that he or she permits or 
forbids substitution of the generic equivalent.  See ALA. CODE § 34-23-8(4) (2014); 
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a)(1), (c) (2014); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 16-42-22-6, 
16-42-22-8(a)(1) (West 2013); MO. REV. STAT. § 338.056 (2013); S.C. CODE ANN.  
§ 39-24-40(b) (2013); UTAH CODE ANN. § 58-17b-605(6)(a) (West 2013); 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.41.120 (West 2013).  Maine requires physicians to 
check a box to indicate that substitution of the generic equivalent is forbidden.  See 
ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13781 (2013).  New York requires physicians to 
write “d a w” (meaning “dispense as written”) to prohibit substitution of the 
generic equivalent.  See N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6810(6)(a) (McKinney 2014).  
Pennsylvania requires physicians to write “brand necessary” or “brand medically 
necessary” on the prescription to indicate that substitution of the generic equivalent 
is forbidden.  See 35 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 960.3(a) (West 2014). 
52 The states that allow generic substitution unless expressly forbidden by the 
physician are Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, Connecticut, 
Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Louisiana, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North 
Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, 
Virginia, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 32-1963.01(A) (2014) (“If a medical practitioner prescribes a brand name 
drug and does not indicate an intent to prevent substitution . . . a pharmacist may 
fill the prescription with a generic equivalent drug.”); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 
112, § 12D (West 2014) (“Except in cases where the practitioner has indicated ‘no 
substitution’, the pharmacist shall dispense a less expensive, reasonably available, 
interchangeable drug product . . . .”). 
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pharmacists to make the substitution when possible, 53  while other 
states merely allow the pharmacist to make the substitution.54  States 
also differ on what kind and what amount of patient notice is required 
before substituting a generic drug.  Ten states do not require any 
patient notice before the pharmacist substitutes a generic drug.55  In 
Arizona, the pharmacist does not have to inform the patient of the 
substitution if a third party reimburses the drug.56  In Iowa and Ohio, 
the pharmacist does not have to inform the patient of the substitution 
if public funding reimburses the drug.57  Five states require patient 
notice of substitution, but do not give the patient the right to refuse 
the generic drug. 58   Twenty-nine states require the pharmacist to 
                                                        
53  The states that require substitution when possible are Florida, Hawaii, 
Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New 
York, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, Vermont, and West Virginia.  See, 
e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 465.025(2) (West 2013) (“A pharmacist who receives a 
prescription for a brand name drug shall, unless requested otherwise by the 
purchaser, substitute a less expensive, generically equivalent drug product . . . .”); 
35 PA. STAT. ANN. § 960.3(a) (West 2014) (“Whenever a pharmacist receives a 
prescription for a brand name drug, the pharmacist shall substitute a less expensive 
generically equivalent drug unless requested otherwise by the purchaser or 
indicated otherwise by the prescriber.”). 
54  The states that allow, rather than require, the pharmacist to make 
substitutions are Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, California, Colorado, 
Connecticut, Delaware, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Michigan, 
Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oregon, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.  See, e.g., ALA. CODE § 34-23-
8(1) (2014) (“A licensed pharmacist in this state shall be permitted to select for the 
brand name drug product . . . a less expensive pharmaceutically and therapeutically 
equivalent drug product . . . .”); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a) (West 2014) 
(“When a pharmacist receives a prescription drug order from a practitioner for a 
brand name or trade name drug, the pharmacist may dispense a therapeutically 
equivalent drug . . . .”).  The statutes in Idaho, Louisiana, and Oklahoma are 
unclear.  IDAHO ADMIN. CODE r. 27.01.01.185 (2013); LA. REV. STAT. ANN.  
§ 37:1241 (2013); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 59, § 353.13(D) (West 2013). 
55  The states that do not require patient notification are Alabama, Illinois, 
Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, New Mexico, New York, North 
Carolina, and Wyoming.  See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 15-118(a) 
(West 2014); WYO. STAT. ANN. § 33-24-148 (West 2013). 
56 ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 32-1963.01(B) (2013). 
57 IOWA CODE ANN. § 155A.32(2)(b) (West 2013); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.  
§ 4729.38 (West 2013). 
58 CAL. BUS. & PROF. CODE §§ 4052.5(e), 4073(e) (West 2014); COLO. REV. 
STAT. § 12-42.5-122(3) (West 2014); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 24, § 2549(a)(2) (West 
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notify the patient of the substitution, which the patient may refuse.59  
Maine, Tennessee, and Vermont require the pharmacist to notify the 
patient of the substitution, which the patient may refuse, but if he 
refuses the substitution he must pay the additional costs of the brand 
name drug out-of-pocket.60 
There are many advantages to allowing generic drug 
substitution.  Generic drugs are just as effective as brand name 
drugs.61  Generic drugs are required to have the same dosage, safety, 
strength, quality, purity, and stability as brand name drugs; generic 
drugs must work the same, must be taken the same, and must be used 
the same way as their brand name equivalents. 62  Generic drug 
substitution lowers healthcare costs for both insurance companies and 
patients. 63   If substitution for a generic drug happened in every 
possible situation, costs could be reduced by an estimated $1.2 billion 
annually for patients and $7.7 billion for health care systems. 64  
Another advantage is that generic substitution makes patients more 
likely to stick with their drug regime; when substitution is not 
allowed, the chance that a patient will not purchase the drug at all 
                                                                                                                                
2014); IND. CODE ANN. § 16-42-22-8(a)(2) (West 2013); VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-
3408.03 (West 2013). 
59 The states that require patient notification of substitution, which the patient 
may refuse, are Alaska, Arkansas, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, 
Kentucky, Louisiana, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Montana, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Oregon, 
Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, 
Washington, West Virginia, and Wisconsin.  See, e.g., GA. CODE ANN. § 26-4-81(f) 
(West 2013) (“A patient for whom a prescription drug order is intended may 
instruct a pharmacist not to substitute a generic name drug in lieu of a brand name 
drug.”); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 69.41.130 (West 2013) (“Unless the brand 
name drug is requested by the patient or the patient’s representative, the pharmacist 
shall substitute an equivalent drug product . . . .”). 
60 ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 32, § 13781 (2013); TENN. CODE ANN. § 53-10-
205(d) (2013); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4605 (West 2013). 
61  Generic Drugs: Questions and Answers, U.S. FOOD & DRUG ADMIN., 
http://www.fda.gov/drugs/resourcesforyou/consumers/questionsanswers/ucm10010
0.htm (last updated Sept. 3, 2013). 
62 Id. 
63 William H. Shrank et al., The Consequences of Requesting “Dispense as 
Written,” 124 AM. J. MED. 309, 311 (2011).  Patients and their insurance 
companies spent an average of $17.90 and $26.67, respectively, on generic drugs 
and an average of $44.50 and $135.26, respectively, for brand name drugs with a 
generic equivalent.  Id. 
64 Id. at 314. 
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increases by 42% and the chance that a patient will not continue to 
refill the prescription increases by 61% when compared to situations 
where generic substitution is allowed.65 
 
III. FEDERAL PREEMPTION DOCTRINE AND FAILURE-TO-WARN 
CLAIMS 
 
The Hatch–Waxman Act caused significant growth in the 
pharmaceutical market by increasing the number of generic drugs 
available to consumers.66  Prior to the Act, “only 35[%] of the top-
selling drugs with expired patents . . . had generic versions available.  
Today, nearly all do.”67  Such success, however, has placed a burden 
on the FDA to ensure that safety requirements are sufficient to 
protect consumers.68 
 
A. Federal Preemption of State Laws 
 
The Supremacy Clause in Article VI, clause two of the U.S. 
Constitution gives rise to the doctrine of federal preemption.69  Under 
this doctrine, federal law may expressly or impliedly preempt state 
law and cause the state law to have no effect.70  State law preemption 
occurs in one of three ways: first, Congress may pass a statute that 
explicitly defines how it preempts state law;71 second, Congress may 
pass a statue that, although lacking expressly preemptive terms, 
implies its occupation of an entire field of regulation and does not 
                                                        
65 Id. at 313. 
66 Steele, supra note 47, at 459. 
67 Id. (alteration in original) (quoting CONGRESSIONAL BUDGET OFFICE, HOW 
INCREASED COMPETITION FROM GENERIC DRUGS HAS AFFECTED PRICES AND 
RETURNS IN THE PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRY 17 (July 1998), available at 
http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/6xx/doc655/pharm.pdf). 
68 Id. 
69 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2 (“This Constitution, and the Laws of the United 
States . . . shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall 
be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the 
Contrary notwithstanding.”). 
70 Chamberlan v. Ford Motor Co., 314 F. Supp. 2d 953 (N.D. Cal. 2004). 
71 Abbot v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 844 F.2d 1108, 1111 (4th Cir. 1988); see, e.g., 
Shaw v. Delta Air Lines, Inc., 463 U.S. 85 (1983) (finding that a New York human 
rights law was preempted by a federal benefit plan based on the federal law’s plain 
language, structure, and legislative history). 
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allow states to regulate any aspect of the area;72 and third, Congress 
may pass a statute that neither expressly nor impliedly preempts state 
law, but state law is still preempted to the extent that the state law 
conflicts with the federal law. 73   Such conflict occurs when it is 
impossible to be in compliance with both the state and federal laws,74 
or when state law hinders the achievement of a federal purpose.75 
There is, however, a presumption against state law 
preemption in areas that the states have traditionally occupied.76  One 
such area is the protection of health and safety.77  The presumption is 
that states have the power to regulate matters of health and safety 
unless the government demonstrates a “clear and manifest purpose” 
to preempt state law. 78   Therefore, Congress or the FDA must 
provide a “clear indication” of an intention to preempt, or the anti-
preemption presumption will apply to state products liability 
claims.79  
Since the federal requirements as outlined by the Hatch–
Waxman Act are different for name brand drug manufacturers and 
generic drug manufacturers, a manufacturers’ liability case revolves 
around whether the drug in question is brand name or generic.80  This 
intrinsic struggle between federal regulations and states’ own drug 
safety laws creates problems, both for manufacturers trying to follow 
the rules and unassuming consumers. 
                                                        
72 Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1111; see, e.g., Rice v. Santa Fe Elevator Corp., 331 U.S. 
218 (1947) (holding that an act passed by Congress in a field traditionally occupied 
by the States preempted Illinois law). 
73 Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1111. 
74 Id.; see also Fla. Lime & Avocado Growers, Inc. v. Paul, 373 U.S. 132, 142 
(1963) (“The test of whether both federal and state regulations may operate, or the 
state regulation must give way, is whether both regulations can be enforced without 
impairing the federal superintendence of the field, not whether they are aimed at 
similar or different objectives.”). 
75 Abbot, 844 F.2d at 1111; see, e.g., Hines v. Davidowitz, 312 U.S. 52 (1941) 
(finding that the federal government has superior authority in the field of alien 
registration, so state regulations cannot “conflict or interfere with, curtail or 
complement, . . . or enforce additional or auxiliary regulations” in that area). 
76 Medtronic, Inc. v. Lohr, 518 U.S. 470, 485 (1996).  
77 Id. 
78 Hillsborough Cnty., Fla. v. Automated Med. Labs., Inc., 471 U.S. 707, 715 
(1985). 
79 Id. at 716. 
80 Suzanne Kaplan, Brand Name or Generic? The Choice Determines Your 
Legal Options When the Drug is Defective, WESTLAW J. PROD. LIAB. (2013), 2013 
WL 3984301, at *1. 
126 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-1 
 
B. Failure-to-Warn Claims Under State Law 
 
State law failure-to-warn claims usually look to the 
Restatement (Second) of Torts for direction. 81   The Restatement 
applies “where the defective condition of the product makes it 
unreasonably dangerous to the user or consumer.”82  Sellers must 
provide directions or warnings on product containers to ensure that 
the products are not unreasonably dangerous.83   Some products—
namely drugs—cannot possibly be made safe, even when used in the 
intended way, but their use may be justified even with the high 
degree of risk involved.84  If the drug is prepared properly and gives 
adequate warning to its consumer, it is not considered unreasonably 
dangerous.85  Sellers of drugs with proper preparation and warning 
cannot be held to strict liability for the consequences of taking the 
drug.86 
 
                                                        
81 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 402A (1965). 
82 Id. at cmt. i.  Many food and drug products can never be entirely safe for 
consumption by all people.  An unreasonably dangerous product is one that is 
“dangerous to an extent beyond that which would be contemplated by the ordinary 
consumer who purchases it, with the ordinary knowledge common to the 
community as to its characteristics.”  Id.  For example, regular butter is not 
unreasonably dangerous just because its ingestion may cause cholesterol build-up 
in a person’s arteries and eventually lead to a heart attack.  Butter would be 
unreasonably dangerous, however, if it was contaminated with poisonous fish oil.  
Id. 
83 Id. at cmt. j.  Sellers do not have a duty to warn against common allergies, 
but if the product contains an ingredient that a large number of people are allergic 
to and the ingredient is either not generally known to be dangerous or not 
reasonably expected to be found in the product, the seller must warn against it if he 
has, or should have, knowledge of the ingredient and its danger.  Id.  Sellers do not 
have a duty to warn consumers about a product or ingredient if it is only dangerous 
when consumed in excess or over a long period of time, or if the danger is 
generally known.  Id. 
84 Id. at cmt. k. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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IV. LEGAL REMEDIES FOR PRESCRIPTION DRUG CONSUMERS 
 
Three recent Supreme Court cases addressed the issue of 
federal preemption of state tort liability claims regarding label 
requirements for brand name and generic manufacturers.87 
 
A. Wyeth v. Levine 
 
In April 2000, Diana Levine was at Northeast Washington 
County Community Health, Inc. (Health Center) to receive treatment 
for a migraine headache.88  Levine suffered nausea as a result of the 
migraine, so the Health Center administered an intramuscular 
injection of Phenergan, the brand name drug for an antihistamine 
manufactured by Wyeth called promethazine hydrochloride.89  When 
the first injection did not provide any relief, the Health Center 
administered a second injection of Phenergan intravenously.90  The 
drug inadvertently entered Levine’s artery and came into contact with 
her blood.91  Levine developed gangrene and her right forearm had to 
be amputated. 92   Because of the amputation, Levine suffered 
significant medical expenses and was no longer able to perform as a 
professional musician.93 
The Court in Wyeth addressed the issue of whether federal 
drug regulations applicable to brand name drug manufacturers 
preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against drug manufacturers 
for failure to properly warn consumers about the risks of taking the 
drug.94  The Court held in a 6–3 decision that federal drug regulations 
do not preempt state law failure-to-warn claims against brand name 
drug manufacturers.95 
Justice Stevens explained that federal law did not preempt 
Levine’s state tort claim because of the two bases of the preemption 
                                                        
87  Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013); PLIVA, Inc. v. 
Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011); Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
88 Levine v. Wyeth, 944 A.2d 179, 182 (Vt. 2006), aff’d, 555 U.S. 555 (2009). 
89 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 559.  
90 Id. 
91 Id. 
92 Id. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. at 563. 
95 Id. at 581. 
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doctrine.96  First and foremost is the purpose of Congress.97  Second, 
in areas where states have traditionally occupied, we must assume 
that the police powers of the state are not preempted by federal law 
unless it is Congress’s “clear and manifest purpose” to preempt those 
powers.98  In reviewing the history of federal regulation of drug laws 
and labeling,99 the Court found that Congress acted to preserve state 
law.100  A provision of the 1962 Keflauver–Harris Amendments to 
the FDCA suggested that only a conflict between state law and the 
FDCA would cause the state law to be preempted.101  Under that 
provision, state tort claims “continued unabated despite . . . FDA 
regulation.”102  Additionally, in 1976, Congress passed an express 
preemption provision for medical devices,103 but chose not to do so 
for prescription drugs, indicating that Congress did not intend to 
preempt state law in that area.104 
The Court rejected Wyeth’s argument that it was impossible 
to comply with both the state and federal laws’ labeling 
requirements.105  “[T]he FDA’s belief that a drug is misbranded is not 
conclusive,” the Court stated, “And the very idea that the FDA would 
bring an enforcement action against a manufacturer for strengthening 
a warning pursuant to the [changes being effected] regulation is 
difficult to accept . . . .”106  The Court explained that the FDA was 
not the primary authority responsible for drug labeling; “it has 
remained a central premise of federal drug regulation that the 
manufacturer bears responsibility for the content of its label at all 
times.”107  The manufacturer is the one held accountable for ensuring 
that a drug’s label is, and remains, adequate.108 
The Court also rejected Wyeth’s argument that state law 
obstructs Congress’s intent to balance competing interests.109  The 
                                                        
96 Id. at 565. 
97 Id. 
98 Id. 
99 See supra Part II. 
100 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567. 
101 Id. 
102 Id. (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 340 (2008)). 
103 See 21 U.S.C. § 360k(a) (2012). 
104 Wyeth, 555 U.S. at 567. 
105 Id. at 568. 
106 Id. at 570. 
107 Id. at 570–71. 
108 Id. at 571. 
109 Id. at 573. 
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lack of federal remedy for consumers injured by unsafe drugs in the 
original statute or its amendments suggests that Congress deemed 
state rights of action to be sufficient relief.110  Congress may have 
also determined that remedies under state law give consumers more 
protection by encouraging manufacturers to produce safe drugs with 
appropriate warnings.111  Congress’s silence on express preemption, 
along with its understanding of the state law claims, indicates that it 
did not intend for the FDA to be the sole governing authority of drug 
safety.112  “If Congress thought state-law suits posed an obstacle to 
its objective, it surely would have enacted an express pre-emption 
provision at some point during the FDCA’s 70-year history.”113 
After the Levine decision, courts routinely held that federal 
drug labeling regulations did not preempt state law requirements for 
adequate drug labeling of brand name drugs. 114   However, courts 
were unsure of how to deal with the issue of preemption concerning 
generic drugs.115  In 2011, the Supreme Court resolved the issue in a 
5–4 decision in Mensing.116 
 
B. PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing 
 
Gladys Mensing and Julie Demahy were each prescribed the 
drug Reglan in 2001 and 2002, respectively. 117   Both women 
received the generic version of Reglan, metoclopramide, from their 
pharmacists.118  After taking the drug for several years, each woman 
developed tardive dyskinesia, a severe neurological disorder.119 
The majority in Mensing addressed the issue of whether 
federal drug regulations applicable to generic drug manufacturers 
preempt state law claims.120  The Court held that the federal drug 
                                                        
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 575. 
113 Id. at 574. 
114 Steele, supra note 47, at 478. 
115  See Demahy v. Activis, Inc., 593 F.3d 428, 431 n.7 (5th Cir. 2010) 
(showing a split among circuit courts on the question of federal preemption of state 
law for generic drugs). 
116 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567 (2011). 
117 Id. at 2573. 
118 Id.  
119 Id. at 2572–73. 
120 Id. at 2572. 
130 Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary 34-1 
regulations do preempt the same state law claims against generic 
drug manufacturers.121  The Court found that, in this case, it was 
impossible for the metoclopramide manufacturers to meet the 
requirements of both the state and federal labeling laws.122  Justice 
Thomas explained that state laws required the manufacturers to 
include a safer label to metoclopramide, but federal law ordered 
generic manufacturers to include the same label on their drugs as 
their brand name counterparts. 123   Therefore, the generic 
manufacturers could not have satisfied both the requirements of the 
state and federal drug labeling laws without additional action, such as 
asking the FDA to change the label of the brand name drug.124 
The Court considered whether conflict preemption should 
take into account possible actions the FDA and brand name drug 
manufacturers could take to allow the generic drug counterparts to 
satisfy both state and federal laws without changing the law. 125  
Federal law does not tell generic drug manufacturers what exactly to 
put on the labels; it merely requires that the generic drug label match 
the associated brand name drug’s label. 126   Consequently, generic 
manufacturers could come into compliance with federal law if they 
could compel the FDA and the brand name drug manufacturer to 
change the label on the brand name drug to fulfill the state law 
labeling requirements that the generic manufacturers are subject to.127  
If the Court were to require generic drug manufacturers to 
convince the FDA to change brand name drug labels, then it would 
no longer be impossible for the generic manufacturers to comply with 
both state and federal labeling laws.128  But the Court rejected that 
proposition: “If these conjectures suffice to prevent federal and state 
law from conflicting for Supremacy Clause purposes, it is unclear 
when, outside of express pre-emption, the Supremacy Clause would 
have any force.” 129   The text of the Supremacy Clause “plainly 
                                                        
121 Id. at 2581. 
122 Id. at 2577–78. 
123 Id. at 2578. 
124 Id. 
125 Id. 
126 Id. 
127 Id. 
128 Id. at 2579. 
129 Id. 
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contemplates conflict pre-emption” and “suggests that federal law 
should be understood to impliedly repeal conflicting state law.”130  
A party establishes preemption when the “ordinary meaning” 
of the federal law disallows the party from acting independently to 
accomplish state law requirements. 131   In this case, the generic 
manufacturers could not meet state law requirements without the 
“special permission and assistance” of the federal government.132  
Thus, the claims of the generic manufacturers were preempted.133 
The Court acknowledged the fact that it makes little sense, 
from a consumer’s perspective, to rule that federal regulations 
preempt in this case but not in Wyeth; however, the Court reasoned 
that it could not disregard the Supremacy Clause simply to please the 
consumer. 134   Unlike the generic manufacturers in Mensing, the 
brand name manufacturers in Wyeth could have changed their labels 
to meet state law guidelines without the assistance of the FDA.135  
Had the injured consumers taken the brand name drug instead of the 
generic, state law would control; but because their pharmacists 
substituted the generic drug—an action that is allowed and 
sometimes required by state law—federal law governs these 
claims.136  Unfortunately for Mensing, Demahy, and other similarly 
situated generic drug consumers, federal drug regulations place 
injured generic drug consumers in the losing position.137 
The dissenting opinion, authored by Justice Sotomayor, 
viewed the issue of preemption differently. 138   She argued that 
federal preemption could only occur when the manufacturers could 
not possible follow both state and federal laws and that it was not 
impossible for the generic manufacturers in this case to comply with 
both sets of laws.139  “[T]he mere possibility of impossibility had not 
been enough to establish pre-emption,” the dissent said, and generic 
manufacturers had the burden of proving that the FDA would have 
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132 Id. at 2580–81. 
133 Id. at 2581. 
134 Id. 
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136 Id. 
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138 Id. at 2582 (Sotomayor, J. dissenting). 
139 Id. 
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denied the request to change the warning.140  The dissent did agree 
with the majority that, under current laws, generic manufacturers are 
not allowed to unilaterally change their labels,141 but then the dissent 
argued that the inability to unilaterally change the warning label was 
not an excuse to do nothing while they believed the label was 
inadequate. 142   Generic manufacturers, the dissent argued, have a 
federal duty to monitor the safety of the drug and should propose 
label modifications to the FDA if the manufacturer believes it is 
necessary. 143   The dissent lamented the effect that the majority’s 
ruling would have on the prescription drug industry, maintaining that 
the holding would decrease demand for generic drugs and create 
ethical quandaries for prescribing physicians.144 
 
C. Mutual Pharmaceutical Co. v. Bartlett 
 
In December 2004, Karen Bartlett went to the doctor for 
treatment of pain in her right shoulder.145  Her doctor prescribed the 
drug Clinoril, a non-steroidal anti-inflammatory drug.146  Bartlett’s 
pharmacist filled the prescription with sulindac, the generic version 
of Clinoril, which was manufactured by Mutual.147  In a matter of 
weeks, Bartlett had to go to the emergency room for skin blisters, a 
fever, eye irritation, and other symptoms.148  She was diagnosed with 
Stevens–Johnson Syndrome (SJS) progressing to toxic epidermal 
necrolysis (TEN). 149   SJS/TEN causes necrosis of the skin and 
mucous membranes and is potentially fatal.150  Bartlett spent three 
months in the hospital and left with permanent injuries, including 
blindness.151  At the time that Bartlett received her prescription for 
sulindac, the label listed SJN/TEN under potential adverse reactions, 
                                                        
140 Id. 
141 Id. at 2585. 
142 Id. 
143 Id. 
144 Id. at 2593. 
145 Bartlett v. Mut. Pharm. Co., 731 F. Supp. 2d 135, 142 (D.N.H. 2010), aff’d, 
678 F.3d 30 (1st Cir. 2012), rev’d , 133 S. Ct. 2466 (2013). 
146 Bartlett, 731 F. Supp. 2d at 142. 
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but did not mention SJS/TEN by name under the warnings section.152 
After Bartlett’s severe reaction to the drug, the FDA conducted an 
analysis of the risks and benefits of nonsteroidal anti-inflammatory 
drugs (NSAIDs), such as sulindac, and recommended changing the 
labels of all NSAIDs, including sulindac, to explicitly warn against 
TEN.153 
The Court in Bartlett addressed the issue of whether federal 
drug regulations preempt state design-defect claims based on the 
adequacy of the drug’s warnings.154  Justice Alito explained that state 
law design-defect claims put the manufacturers in a situation where 
they are in conflict with federal regulations because the only ways for 
the manufacturers to improve a drug’s safety are either to change the 
drug’s composition or change the labeling, both of which are not 
allowable actions under federal drug regulation laws.155  The Court 
held that generic drug manufacturers cannot be sued under state law 
for injuries caused by their products because the state law is 
preempted by federal law. 156   This case shows that the Court 
followed the same line of reasoning used for failure-to-warn claims 
in Mensing to extend federal preemption to design-defect claims. 
Although the holding in Bartlett is very similar to the Court’s 
holding in Mensing, Bartlett addressed two issues that Mensing left 
undecided. 157   First, the Court established that impossibility 
preemption applies to design-defect claims in addition to failure-to-
warn claims.158  Just as generic drug manufacturers are prohibited 
from changing the labels on their drugs without FDA approval, so too 
are the manufacturers prohibited from unilaterally altering the design 
of their drugs.159  Therefore, it was almost inevitable that the Court 
would extend the Mensing decision to apply to design-defect 
claims. 160   Second, the majority rejected the “stop-selling” 
rationale—the theory that the generic manufacturer could escape the 
impossibility of complying with both federal and state laws by 
                                                        
152 Id. 
153 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2472 (2013). 
154 Id. at 2470. 
155 Id. at 2479. 
156 Id. at 2470. 
157 Louis M. Bograd, Doubling Down on Generic Drug Preemption, TRIAL, 
Nov. 2013, at 52. 
158 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470. 
159 Id. at 2477–78. 
160 Bograd, supra note 157, at 54. 
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choosing not to produce the drug at all—as a valid option for 
manufacturers to avoid impossibility preemption. 161   Again, this 
decision was not surprising given that acceptance of the stop-selling 
rationale would also effectively overturn the decisions in Mensing 
and other failure-to-warn cases.162 
The Supreme Court’s recent decisions addressing the issue of 
federal preemption of state tort liability claims against brand name 
and generic manufacturers have clearly established the scope of 
federal preemption in certain types of cases, but have also raised 
questions about whether the laws that limit the legal remedies 
available to consumers are appropriate. In Wyeth, the Court found 
that brand name drug manufacturers are not preempted from failure-
to-warn claims because they can change the warning labels of their 
products without FDA approval.163  But despite the Wyeth Court’s 
ruling, the Court decided in Mensing that federal law does preempt 
generic drug manufacturers from state law failure-to-warn claims 
because generic manufacturers cannot strengthen their drugs’ 
warning labels unilaterally. 164  Finally, the Court further restricted 
consumer remedies against drug manufacturers in Bartlett by holding 
that state law design-defect claims against generic manufacturers are 
also preempted by federal law because generic manufacturers cannot 
change the composition of their drugs unilaterally.165 
 
V. INNOVATOR LIABILITY THEORY 
 
In light of the Supreme Court’s decisions in Wyeth, Mensing, 
and Bartlett, state courts are grappling with how to provide injured 
consumers with remedies in state tort law if a generic drug caused the 
injury.  Courts in Alabama, California, and Vermont have adopted 
the innovator liability theory (also called competitor liability theory), 
which holds brand name drug manufacturers liable when a consumer 
is injured after taking the generic version of the drug.166  The theory 
                                                        
161 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2477. 
162 Id. at 2478. 
163 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 591 (2009). 
164 PLIVA, Inc. v. Mensing, 131 S. Ct. 2567, 2578 (2011). 
165 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2470. 
166 See Wyeth, Inc. v. Weeks, No. 1:10-cv-602, 2013 WL 135753, at *19 
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on statements it made in connection with the manufacture of a brand-name 
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is based on the belief that a consumer taking a generic drug should be 
able to reasonably rely on the warnings on the brand name drug 
equivalent, since the generic and brand name drugs must be 
bioequivalent and have identical labels.167  Since the consumer may 
rely on the brand name drug warnings, the consumer maintains the 
right to a file a failure-to-warn claim against the brand name 
manufacturer, regardless of whether the consumer actually used and 
was injured by the brand name drug.168  
When an injured consumer files a failure-to-warn claim, it is a 
negligence action.169  In order to prove negligence, the plaintiff must 
prove that the brand name manufacturer had a duty to warn, that the 
duty to warn was breached, and that the breach of duty was caused by 
the brand name manufacturer’s failure to warn.170  The standard of 
care is that of the average reasonable person. 171  Since failure-to-
warn is not a claim of a manufacturing defect, liability is not limited 
to the company who actually manufactured the drug.172  Therefore, 
creative attorneys have tried to find ways to subject brand name 
manufacturers to liability even when the injured plaintiff only took 
the generic form of the drug. 
The Fourth Circuit was the first appellate court to address the 
innovator liability theory in the pharmaceutical industry. 173   The 
court held in Foster v. American Home Products, Corp. that the 
injured plaintiff could not recover from the brand name manufacturer 
when she was injured by the generic drug.174  The court found that 
the brand name manufacturer did not have a duty of care to the 
plaintiff because the plaintiff was not injured by the manufacturer’s 
drug.175  In order to prevail against the brand name manufacturer, the 
                                                                                                                                
prescription drug, by a plaintiff claiming physical injury caused by a generic drug 
manufactured by a different company.”); Kellogg v. Wyeth, 762 F. Supp. 2d 694 
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plaintiff would have had to show that the defendant actually 
manufactured the product that caused the injury.176 
Innovator liability claims were previously unsuccessful 177 
because courts relied on the ability of generic manufacturers to add 
or supplement warnings on their drugs.178  But in 2008, a California 
appellate court became the first to allow an injured consumer to bring 
a claim against a brand name manufacturer for injuries caused by the 
generic version of the drug.179   In Conte v. Wyeth, Inc., plaintiff 
Elizabeth Conte took the generic drug metoclopramide for the brand 
name drug Reglan.180  After taking metoclopramide for several years, 
Conte developed a debilitating neurological disorder.181  She filed 
suit against both the generic and brand name manufacturers, claiming 
that the drug’s label did not adequately warn about the serious side 
effects of long-term use. 182   The court held that the brand name 
manufacturer had a duty of care to consumers of the generic drug 
because it was “eminently foreseeable” that a patient would receive 
the generic drug based on the representation from the brand name 
manufacturer about the brand name drug.183 
 In Kellogg v. Wyeth, a federal court similarly found that it 
was “reasonably foreseeable that a physician will rely upon a brand 
name manufacturer’s representations—or the absence of 
representations—about the risk of side effects of its drug, . . . 
regardless of whether the pharmacist fills the prescription with a 
generic form of the drug.”184   
Although innovator liability has been claimed in many cases, 
very few courts have actually followed the lead of Conte and Kellogg 
in shifting liability.185  The Levine and Mensing decisions, however, 
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have brought the option of innovator liability back to light, since the 
results of these two decisions created two different sets of liability 
rules for brand name manufacturers and generic manufacturers.186  
Because generic drug users do not have the same options for 
recovery that brand name drug users do, it is likely that attorneys and 
courts will be more open to the innovator liability argument. 
 
A. Duty to Warn 
 
The general nature of the duty to warn allows it to apply to 
consumers who relied on the brand name manufacturer’s warnings, 
even if the actual drug ingested by the consumer was a generic 
version. 187   Brand name manufacturers have a duty to avoid 
foreseeable harm by properly warning consumers of the drug. 188  
Since it is foreseeable that generic manufacturing companies will 
eventually produce a generic version of the brand name company’s 
drug, that duty extends to the third parties that take the generic 
version.189  Although courts previously disregarded foreseeability as 
stretching the concept too far,190 the Mensing and Bartlett decisions 
made it easily foreseeable that generic drug consumers will rely on 
brand name drug warnings because that is the only warning 
allowed.191  Furthermore, since substituting generic drugs for brand 
name is common practice by pharmacists,192 it makes it even more 
foreseeable that generic drug consumers will rely on the brand name 
drug warnings.193 
One might argue that a generic manufacturer assumes the risk 
of inadequate labeling by the brand name manufacturer, but in 
negligence cases the defendant is only liable if the adopted label was 
negligently adopted.194  Since the brand name drug labels must be 
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FDA-approved and the generic drug manufacturers are legally 
required to adopt the brand name label, it is not negligent for the 
generic manufacturers to do so.195 
 
B. Cause of the Harm 
 
In a failure-to-warn case, the harm is caused by an inadequate 
warning; it is not the drug itself that causes the harm.196  In order to 
prevail on a failure-to-warn claim, the consumer must prove factual 
cause, which means “but for” the inadequate warning, the consumer 
of the drug would not have suffered harm.197  Even though, under 
Mensing and Bartlett, a manufacturer cannot be held responsible for 
a warning that it did not create and that it was legally required to put 
on its product,198 it is the inadequate warning that causes the harm, 
not the manufacturing of the drug itself.199  Any inadequacy in the 
brand name drug’s original warning will flow down to the generic 
drug’s warning, causing foreseeable harm to the generic consumer.200  
It is direct causation because the generic manufacturer cannot alter 
the warning in any way. 201   The only action that a generic 
manufacturer can take is to choose not to market an inadequately 
labeled drug or inform the FDA of the inadequate warning.202  In 
either case, the action is not a superseding cause and therefore does 
not change the fact that the brand name manufacturer caused the 
harm with the inadequate label.203 
The learned intermediary doctrine also creates a cause of 
harm by brand name manufacturers. 204   The learned intermediary 
doctrine states that a brand name manufacturer’s duty to warn is met 
when a physician relies on the manufacturer’s warning when 
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prescribing the drug. 205   If the doctor relies on an inadequate 
warning, the harm is done at that time; it does not matter that a 
pharmacist may later fill the prescription with the generic drug.206 
Under current FDA regulations, a generic drug manufacturer 
cannot alter the warning from the brand name drug.207  Since the 
generic manufacturer cannot and does not create the warning for the 
drug that causes harm to a consumer, the generic manufacturer 
cannot be held liable.  A manufacturer cannot be held responsible for 
a warning that it did not create and that it was legally required to put 
on its product.208  Another way to look at the issue is that if one 
particular generic manufacturer exits the market, it will not decrease 
the harm done to consumers of the generic drug; the pharmacist will 
just prescribe a generic drug from a different manufacturer (or the 
brand name drug) and it will have the same inadequate warning.209  
The only way for the harm to be avoided is for the brand name 
manufacturer to change the warning. 
 
C. Implications of Innovator Liability 
 
Innovator liability creates problems for brand name 
manufacturers.  Since the brand name manufacturer is the one who 
invests time and money into the research and development of the 
drug, the increased liability reduces the profitability of producing 
new drugs and allows generic manufacturers to enjoy the benefits of 
the brand name manufacturer’s work without the additional 
liability.210  Even if the brand name drug is removed from the market, 
the manufacturer is still liable for harm caused by competing generic 
drugs.211  Although it may seem unfair, it is still the brand name 
manufacturer’s negligence in labeling that is the cause of the injury 
and whether or not the manufacturer continues to sell the product has 
no impact on its duty to consumers who rely on the manufacturer’s 
labeling.212 
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Innovator liability also creates problems concerning generic 
drug manufacturing as well.213  Since the generic manufacturers are 
not at risk for inadequate warnings on their drugs, they are able to 
sell their drugs to consumers at a low price, but that price is not a true 
reflection of the cost of selling a potentially harmful drug.214  If the 
drug is indeed inadequately labeled, the harm to society might be 
increased because more people are able to afford and consume the 
drug.215  The brand name manufacturer would be the one liable for 
the harm caused to all the injured consumers, and that would 
disincentivize the brand name manufacturer from researching and 
developing new drugs at the risk of inadequately labeling the drug.216  
Overall, innovator liability likely results in less new drug 
development.217 
Since current FDA regulations prohibit a generic drug 
manufacturer from altering the warning label from the brand name 
drug, the generic manufacturer cannot be held liable for a poorly 
labeled drug.218  Although protecting generic manufacturers against 
liability for something they cannot control is a correct application of 
current administrative regulations, it has significant negative 
implications for brand name manufacturers, prescription drug 
consumers, and even generic manufacturers.  
 
VI.  IMPACT ON DRUG SUBSTITUTIONS 
 
Although the recent Court decisions were a win for generic 
drug manufacturers, there will likely be some repercussions in the 
form of decreased numbers of generic drug substitutions. 219  
Decreased numbers of substitutions would happen because 
physicians would stop allowing substitutions, pharmacists would stop 
making automatic substitutions, patients would start denying 
substitutions or requesting brand name drugs, or states would change 
their substitution laws to deter or eliminate generic substitutions.220 
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Physicians have several motivations for disallowing 
substitutions.221  One reason is to preserve the patient’s right to seek 
compensation if the generic drug is inadequately labeled.222  Another 
reason is to avoid malpractice claims against them for negligently 
prescribing an inadequately labeled drug.223  Patients have the ability 
to sue multiple sources for their injuries, so a physician could be sued 
for negligently prescribing the medication that caused the injury.224  
If physicians feel as though inadequately labeled generic drugs may 
harm their patients, it is likely that physicians will start to prevent 
substitution more frequently.225 
Perhaps the largest potential cause of decreased drug 
substitutions would be changes in state laws.  Although most changes 
to drug substitution laws have been in favor of promoting drug 
substitution, 226  the recent Supreme Court decisions in Wyeth, 
Mensing, and Bartlett will increase the pressure on states to change 
their laws to discourage generic substitution.  The ten states that 
allow pharmacists to substitute generic drugs without informing the 
patient227 are more likely to seek to change their laws so that patients 
are not deprived of their rights to sue the manufacturer without 
notice; studies show that patient consent is correlated to a decrease in 
generic substitution.228  
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States are also more likely to change their laws to require 
physicians to expressly state whether generic substitution is permitted 
to not, which would force physicians to consider the question each 
time they prescribed a drug.229  States have to find a way to balance 
the financial and compliance benefits of generic substitution with the 
deprivation of the right to seek compensation that is now a concern in 
light of the recent Court decisions. 
 
VII. WAYS TO BALANCE OPTIONS FOR PATIENTS HARMED BY 
BRAND NAME OR GENERIC DRUGS 
 
There are several ways that the differences in treatment 
between harms caused by brand name drugs and harms caused by 
generic drugs can be balanced for the consumer.  The Court may 
reverse or limit the holdings from Wyeth, Mensing, or Bartlett, but 
such action is very unlikely unless the FDA changes its position, 
because the Court relied on the FDA’s regulations and interpretations 
in coming to its decisions in those cases.230  Other ways to balance 
treatment are waiver of the preemption defense by generic 
manufacturers (either by the manufacturer’s own choice or by force 
by the state), state action that would permit injured consumers to 
bring an action against the brand name manufacturer (under the 
innovator liability theory), or congressional action to overrule any of 
the Court’s decisions.231 
 
A. No Changes 
 
Under the current post-Mensing law, attorneys for clients 
injured by generic drugs do not have the option to seek damages 
under state failure-to-warn claims.232  University of California, Irvine 
School of Law Dean Erwin Chemerinsky believes that, until a better 
solution is put into place, attorneys have the responsibility to find 
alternative ways to litigate on behalf of such clients. 233   “The 
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immediate challenge for lawyers representing patients harmed by 
generic drugs,” Chemerinsky says, “is to develop alternative 
litigation theories.  This may require suing parties other than the 
makers of generic drugs or devising claims based on grounds other 
than failure to warn.”234  Possible alternatives include bringing claims 
against the prescriber of the injuring drug or taking action against the 
manufacturer for negligence or fraud.235   
Advocates of the current law argue that Congress’s purpose, 
as conveyed through the Hatch–Waxman Amendments, is to allow 
federal preemption for generic drug manufacturers with respect to 
state failure-to-warn claims.236  They believe that if Congress had 
intended an alternative to be available, it would have expressly 
addressed the issue in the Amendments;237 in fact, they contend that 
Congress’s real purpose for sheltering generic manufacturers from 
failure-to-warn liability is to maintain low costs for prescription drug 
consumers. 238   More consumers will have access to prescription 
medications if generic manufacturers can keep their drug costs low in 
part by avoiding costly litigation.239 
Opponents of the current law maintain that the use of generic 
drugs will decline because physicians will be more hesitant to 
prescribe generic drugs or allow for generic substitution, and 
consumers will be deterred from using generic drugs because of the 
legal implications.240  They also argue that the current law limits the 
rights of consumers injured by generic drugs with inadequate labels, 
allows for a regulatory system that will negatively affect drug safety, 
and is at odds with Congress’s purpose to make brand name and 
generic drugs identical. 241   Congress allowed for an abbreviated 
approval process for generic drugs because they are bioequivalent to 
their brand name counterparts. 242   This revised process allowed 
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Congress to “provide a safe, effective, low cost alternative to the 
American public.”243  Challengers of the Mensing decision argue that 
allowing different levels of state tort liability to apply to generic and 
brand name drug manufacturers is, in essence, stating that generic 
and brand name drugs are not equivalents and that only consumers of 
brand name drugs have to right to bring failure-to-warn claims in 
state court.244   
 
B. Reverse or Limit the Holdings 
 
The Supreme Court has the authority to reverse or limit its 
holding in a previous case.245  Although it is unlikely that the Court 
would choose to reverse or limit any of its holdings of its own 
accord, it seems more likely if the FDA makes certain changes to its 
guidelines.  In Mensing, the Court states “[a]ll relevant events in 
these cases predate the Food and Drug Administration Amendments 
Act of 2007.  We therefore refer exclusively to the pre–2007 statutes 
and regulations and express no view on the impact of the 2007 
Act.”246  The meaning of this statement is not clear, but there are a 
few possibilities. 247   The first is that the Court believes the 
amendments granted the FDA the ability to require post-market 
studies, and such action would cause the Court to come to a different 
decision in Mensing. 248   If the FDA requires generic drug 
manufacturers to perform post–market studies, then those 
manufacturers might have enough information about the drug that 
they could be allowed to amend their own labels.249  In that case, 
state law would not be preempted because the label changes would 
be allowed and Mensing would not be good law. 
The Court’s statement may also be in reference to the ability 
granted by the amendments to the FDA to order label changes.250  
Prior to the 2007 amendments, the FDA could suggest a label change 
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to a brand name drug manufacturer but the manufacturer was free to 
disregard the suggestion; the FDA could chose not to continue to 
approve a drug with a label that did not include the FDA’s suggested 
changes, but the manufacturer had no obligation to make the 
suggested changes. 251   Now, the FDA does not have to try to 
convince the brand name manufacturer that a change needs to be 
made; the FDA can just mandate the change.252  In Mensing, the 
claim was brought under pre-2007 rules, so the FDA could not just 
force the brand name manufacturer to change its label.  The generic 
manufacturer would have had to ask the FDA to suggest a label 
change, and then the FDA would have had to negotiate with the 
brand name manufacturer to decide on and implement a new label.253  
Regardless of the amendments, however, the generic manufacturer 
would still be unable to independently change the labels on its drugs, 
and that is what the Court relied on to determine the impossibility of 
the manufacturers’ compliance with state and federal law. 254  
Therefore, it is unlikely that such an interpretation of the Court’s 
statement would have reversed its decision. 
 
C. FDA Change of Position 
 
The most likely method of changing the results of Mensing 
and Bartlett is for the FDA to allow generic manufacturers to 
unilaterally change their drug labels.255  The FDA was the originator 
of the distinction between brand name and generic manufacturers; the 
Court just followed suit.256  The FDA’s rationale for the distinction 
was that it wanted brand name and generic drugs to be equivalent so 
that a consumer could rely on a generic drug to be equivalent to the 
brand name. 257   Consistent labeling, the FDA reasoned, would 
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minimize confusion and enforce confidence in product 
equivalency.258  
The generic manufacturer, however, argued that the ability to 
unilaterally change or add to warnings created benefits that 
outweighed those of consistent labeling.259  If the change proposed 
by the generic manufacturer is agreed to by the FDA, then the brand 
name manufacturer would have to change its label as well and there 
would still be consistency; if the FDA did not agree with the change, 
the generic manufacturer would return to the brand name label.260  
Also, even under the current rules, when a brand name manufacturer 
changes its label to reflect new warnings, it takes time for the FDA to 
review the change and for the generic manufacturers the change their 
labels, so labels are already inconsistent between the brand name and 
generic drug during that period of change.261  If the FDA changed its 
regulations to allow generic manufacturers to unilaterally change 
their labels, then it seems likely that the Court would change its 
position.262 
 
D. Generic Manufacturer Waiver of Its Preemption Defense 
 
Another option for altering the outcome caused by the Court’s 
decisions is for generic drug manufacturers to waive their preemption 
defense. 263   Even though it seems counterintuitive for the very 
companies who fought for federal preemption from failure-to-warn 
claims264 to waive that defense, it might become a good business 
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practice for generic manufacturers if sales of generic drugs decrease 
due to the decrease in generic drug substitutions. 265   Generic 
manufacturers would face a problem, however, if they attempted to 
waive their preemption defense.266  Since generic manufacturers are 
generally not distinguishable as individual companies by consumers, 
the manufacturers do not advertise their products because doing so 
would benefit all generic drugs with the same chemical name.267  The 
same issue occurs if a generic manufacturer decides that it would be 
beneficial to waive its preemption defense; if one generic 
manufacturer waives its preemption defense, then all the 
manufacturers will gain consumer goodwill, even if they do not all 
allow their consumers to sue.268  Therefore, even though the effect of 
preemption might be harmful to the generic manufacturers’ bottom 
line, waiving the preemption defense may not work to avoid the 
problem.269 
 
E. State Action 
 
States do not have the statutory authority to overrule the 
Supreme Court’s decisions, but there are other options that states can 
pursue.270  Two options are: (1) to require generic manufacturers to 
waive their preemption defense before allowing that manufacturer’s 
drug to be substituted, or (2) to allow injured patients to bring suits 
against the equivalent brand name drug manufacturers.271 
A required waiver would limit generic drug substitution to 
only drugs from manufacturers that waived their preemption 
defense. 272   The state would maintain a list of generic drug 
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manufacturers that had waived their preemption defense and only 
drugs from those manufacturers would be allowed to be substituted 
for brand name drugs. 273   Therefore, generic drug manufacturers 
would have the choice of whether or not they wanted to waive their 
tort liability.  If the manufacturer chose not to waive its preemption 
defense, then substitution of its generic drug for the equivalent brand 
name drug would not be allowed in that state.274   
One potential problem with required waivers would arise if 
contractual waivers are not judicially enforceable. 275   The First 
Circuit has held that “[a] statutory right or remedy may be waived 
when the waiver would not frustrate the public policies of the statute. 
. . .  [But a] statutory right may not be disclaimed if the waiver could 
‘do violence to the public policy underlying the legislative 
enactment.’”276  If allowing state tort claims for inadequate labeling 
clashes with the policies underlying the Hatch–Waxman Act, then the 
Court would likely find that state laws requiring generic 
manufacturers to waive their preemption defense are invalid as 
“obstacle[s] to the accomplishment and execution of the full purposes 
and objectives of Congress.”277 
The second option for states, to allow suits against equivalent 
brand name drug manufacturers, would allow injured patients to have 
some form of recourse against drug manufacturers.  The logic behind 
allowing these types of suits is that the reason the generic drug label 
was not more accurate was because the brand name had not changed 
its label to be more accurate.278  Most courts at this time do not allow 
this argument and require that an injured plaintiff must have taken 
the defendant manufacturer’s drug, not a bioequivalent drug.279 
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F. Congressional Action 
 
Congress could balance the difference in treatment of claims 
for injured patients by making the preemption laws uniform for both 
brand name and generic drugs.280  The Court in Wyeth,281 Mensing,282 
and Bartlett283 makes it clear that Congress did not explicitly state 
whether it wanted preemption or not, and had Congress made the 
point explicitly, the Court would have accepted and followed that 
decision.  If Congress would either explicitly make preemption laws 
consistent for both generic and brand name drug manufacturers or 
allow generic drug manufacturers to unilaterally change their labels, 
then the decisions in Mensing and Bartlett would effectively be 
reversed.284 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 
It is clear from the amount of money spent on prescription 
drugs in the United States and the increase in spending on generic 
drugs that the effects of choosing a generic drug over a brand name 
drug are increasingly important for consumers who might be injured 
by the drug.  The lower cost of generic drugs make substitution an 
appealing choice, but patients may not know about the hidden risks 
of choosing generic over brand name.  The Supreme Court has 
                                                        
280 Kazhdan, supra note 219, at 925. 
281 Wyeth v. Levine, 555 U.S. 555, 574–75 (2009) (“‘Congress could have 
applied the pre-emption clause to the entire FDCA. It did not do so . . . .’  Its 
silence on the issue, coupled with its certain awareness of the prevalence of state 
tort litigation, is powerful evidence that Congress did not intend FDA oversight to 
be the exclusive means of ensuring drug safety and effectiveness.”) (footnote 
omitted) (quoting Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 552 U.S. 312, 327 (2008)). 
282  Mensing, 131 S. Ct. at 2576 n.5 (“The Hatch-Waxman Amendments 
contain no provision expressly pre-empting state tort claims.  Nor do they contain 
any saving clause to expressly preserve state tort claims.  Although an express 
statement on pre-emption is always preferable, the lack of such a statement does 
not end our inquiry. . . .  [T]he absence of express pre-emption is not a reason to 
find no conflict pre-emption.”) (original citations omitted). 
283 Mut. Pharm. Co. v. Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. 2466, 2480 (2013) (“[T]he Court 
would welcome Congress’ ‘explicit’ resolution of the difficult pre-emption 
questions that arise in the prescription drug context. . . .  In the absence of that sort 
of ‘explicit’ expression of congressional intent, we are left to divine Congress’ will 
from the duties the statute imposes.”). 
284 Kazhdan, supra note 219, at 925. 
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endured much criticism for its decisions in Wyeth, Mensing, and 
Bartlett and it acknowledges, the “situation is tragic and evokes deep 
sympathy,” however, “a straightforward application of pre-emption 
law” requires that federal law preempts state failure-to-warn and 
design-defect claims. 285   Therefore, the FDA and Congress must 
work together to resolve the preemption issues arising out of state 
tort claims by patients injured by generic drugs in order for the 
Supreme Court to change its stance in the matter. 
As the decisions in Mensing and Bartlett demonstrated, the 
current preemption laws do not give the Court the ability to allow 
state tort claims against generic manufacturers.  The FDA and 
Congress have the ability to change the laws so that this imbalance 
can be righted.  Although there are other ways that the states or 
manufacturers could work to provide a solution to the problem, it 
should ultimately fall to the FDA and Congress to revise the 
preemption laws to allow injured patients to bring claims against 
generic manufacturers.  By doing so, the FDA and Congress could 
bring individual liability to federal drug regulation and the state tort 
systems where current laws have created unwanted and unnecessary 
results. 
                                                        
285 Bartlett, 133 S. Ct. at 2480. 
